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‘FinTech’ is the digital sector of retail money and finance widely proclaimed to be transforming 
banking in the global North and ‘banking the unbanked’ in the global South. This paper 
develops a perspective for critically understanding FinTech as a platform political economy 
that is marked by three distinctive and related processes: reintermediation, consolidation, and 
capitalisation. Through experimentation with the platform business model and building on the 
digital infrastructures and data flows of the broader platform ecosystem, a constellation of 
organisations – including start-ups, early-career firms, BigTech companies and incumbent 
banks – are engaged in processes of platform reintermediation. Changing the bases of 
competition in retail money and financial markets and encouraging oligopoly and even 
monopoly, the reintermediation processes of FinTech are presently manifest in strong 
tendencies towards platform consolidation. The imagined potential of FinTech has also 
triggered intensive processes of capitalisation, with platforms receiving significant prospective 
investment by venture capital, private equity funds, banks and BigTech firms.  
 





1. Introduction  
‘FinTech’ is the recognized descriptor for an emergent and diverse sector of digital 
retail monetary and financial services. It is the object of media hype (e.g. Hancock et al. 2018; 
Economist 2017), a focus for national financial policymaking and regulation (HM Treasury 
2018; National Economic Council 2017; Barainard 2020), and is enthusiastically promoted 
within global development programmes (e.g. Alliance for Financial Inclusion 2018; World 
Bank and the International Monetary Fund 2018). FinTech has also generated a burgeoning 
academic-practitioner literature, emanating mainly from business schools, industry 
commentators and consultancy firms (e.g. Blakstad and Allen 2018; Delaporte, Price, and 
Bastid 2016; Gupta and Tham 2018; pwc 2017). Combined, this work maps a rapidly evolving 
landscape, identifies active business models, and ascertains the challenges that might limit 
future expansion. Invoking the well-worn Silicon Valley tropes of ‘disruption’, 
‘distintermediation’ and ‘democratisation’ that are ubiquitous in digital economy discourse, 
prevailing and powerful media, policy and academic-practitioner accounts of FinTech typically 
emphasize how consumer-empowering technological innovations are not only transforming 
banking in the global North, but also ‘banking the unbanked’ in the global South.  
A rapidly growing body of social science research is exploring the main domains of 
FinTech business. This work has mainly focused on digital and mobile payments (e.g. Kremers 
and Brassett 2017; Maurer 2012; O'Dwyer 2015, 2019), cryptocurrencies and distributed ledger 
technologies (e.g. Golumbia 2016; Tapscott and Tapscott 2016; Parkin 2019), asset 
management and ‘robo-advising’ (Haberly et al. 2019), and crowdfunding and peer-to-peer 
(P2P) lending (Clarke 2019; Gray and Zhang 2017; Langley 2016; Langley and Leyshon 2017). 
Research is also interrogating the FinTech sector more broadly, making connections with 
wider-ranging developments, including technological transformations underway across 
wholesale and retail finance (Bernards and Campbell-Verduyn 2019; Campbell-Verduyn, 
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Goguen, and Porter 2017), and continuity and change in the ‘developmental states’ of China 
and East Asia (Gruin 2019; Gruin and Knaack 2019; Rethel and Thurbon 2019). In addition, 
FinTech is being researched by social scientists concerned with revised global development 
agendas that prioritise ‘financial inclusion’ at the ‘bottom of the pyramid’ (BoP), and which 
serve to extend the frontiers of neoliberal financialised capitalism in the global South (Aitken 
2017; Bernards 2019a, 2019b; Gabor and Brooks 2017; Langevin 2019; Mader 2016, 2018).  
Across this research, moreover, social scientists are beginning to offer analytical 
perspectives that provide a counterpoint to the prevailing and powerful accounts of FinTech. 
Drawing on critical literature apprehending the global digital economy more broadly, these 
perspectives presently serve to highlight two facets of FinTech crucial to understanding its 
dynamics and pathologies. The first is the use of techniques of data aggregation and algorithmic 
analysis to extract value from users and their data trails (Bernards 2019a, 2019b; Gabor and 
Brooks 2017; Langevin 2019; O'Dwyer 2015, 2019; Sadowski 2019). Pivotal to the digital 
economies of ‘surveillance capitalism’ (Zuboff 2019), data figures strongly but somewhat 
differently in FinTech. Transaction data produced by digital and mobile payments is aggregated 
and monetised by FinTech firms, going beyond a revenue model based solely on fees levied 
on user transactions (Maurer and Swartz 2015). Combined with other contextual data, 
transaction data is mobilised in retail finance for market segmentation (i.e. classifying 
customers for advertising and sales purposes) and credit risk analysis (i.e. developing tailored 
credit products and risk management tools) (O'Dwyer 2019). Indeed, transactional, geo-spatial, 
telecommunication and social media data are combined by FinTech firms to produce new kinds 
of ‘proxy’ credit risk data (Aitken 2017). This is significant, given claims that such proxies can 
render visible roughly 40 percent of the global adult population (~1.7 billion people) who are 
currently ‘unbanked’ and lack credit histories and scores (Realini and Metha 2015; World Bank 
2017). Promises of transaction data-derived financial inclusion often garner support in 
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developing countries from state agencies seeking to advance the surveillance and taxation of 
their populations (Jain and Gabor 2020).             
Second, perspectives offered by social scientists stress how the FinTech industry 
deploys infrastructures of digital technology and wireless telecommunication to connect with 
users, often in conjunction with longer-standing payment and financial architectures (Bernards 
and Campbell-Verduyn 2019; O'Dwyer 2019; Maurer 2012). Grandiose and spectacular claims 
about FinTech are punctured with reference to the mundane and ‘backgrounded’ operations of 
assembled socio-technical systems (Bernards and Campbell-Verduyn 2019, 783), and 
emphasis is placed on the ways in which these infrastructures frame monetary and financial 
relations to create new opportunities and vulnerabilities for users (e.g. Rodima-Taylor and 
Grimes 2019). Indeed, Clarke (2019, 866) draws attention to the tendency for governmental 
programmes to present the kinds of financial service products now offered by FinTech as ‘part 
of the basic “infrastructures” of contemporary societies’.  Justifying the development of 
products for marginal customers, this discourse also makes it possible for the FinTech sector 
to ‘profit at the expense of people who become increasingly indebted’ (ibid). 
This paper aims to extend existing social science research by developing a perspective 
for critically understanding FinTech as a platform political economy; that is, as a political 
economy which is always already constituted through the logics and logistics of platforms 
(Guyer 2016). In doing so, we will broadly situate the understanding of FinTech within 
analyses of the global digital economy as a ‘platform economy’ (Bratton 2015; Kenney and 
Zysman 2018, 2020; van Dijck, Poell, and De Waal 2019) and as ‘platform capitalism’ (Srnicek 
2016; Pasquale 2016; Sadowski 2020). Although the notion of ‘platform’ is certainly present 
in social science research on FinTech (e.g. Clarke 2019; Maurer 2015; O'Dwyer 2019), it rarely 
provides the conceptual entry point (cf. Hendrikse, Bassens, and Van Meeteren 2018). As 
Haberly et al. (2019, 168) observe in their study of asset management as one line of FinTech 
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business, ‘for all of the analyses of the impact of new technologies in finance; and of the digital 
platform economy outside of finance; there has not been a systematic evaluation of the impact 
of the digital platform model’. Here we develop a perspective for understanding the political 
economy of FinTech as produced by organisational leverage of ‘the platform’ in retail money 
and finance. This perspective is directly informed by our wider work that – by combining 
insights from heterodox political economy, cultural economy and science and technology 
studies (STS) – theorises ‘platform capitalism’ as the rise of a distinctive and powerful mode 
of capitalist intermediation made possible by a host of socio-technical achievements (Langley 
and Leyshon 2017b). It thereby emphasises experimentation with the platform business model 
underway throughout the FinTech sector, a model of capitalist enterprise that brings together 
relatively well-established economic and socio-technical practices to create a new intermediary 
logic of data-rich accumulation. It also stresses how the political economy of FinTech operates 
through ‘the stack’, a logistical assemblage of digital infrastructures and data flows that is 
enclosed and controlled by BigTech platforms and which broadly comprises the ‘platform 
ecosystem’ (Bratton 2015; van Dijck, Poell, and De Waal 2019).  
Understanding FinTech as a platform political economy serves to foreground its 
commercial and institutional configuration, and thereby re-orientates critical analysis of the 
constitutive role of data and digital infrastructures in its operations. Analysed from this 
perspective, we will also show how FinTech is marked by processes of platform political 
economy that confound evangelical claims that it disintermedates, disrupts and democratises 
retail money and finance. We identify and elaborate upon the distinct and related processes of 
reintermediation, consolidation and capitalisation shaping the FinTech sector and its 




The remainder of the paper is organised into three sections. The first introduces FinTech 
and further develops our perspective. The second addresses, in turn, the processes of 
reintermediation, consolidation and capitalisation that are underway in the platform political 
economy of FinTech. Our conceptual and analytical intervention intends to provoke further, 
in-depth research into the strategies and practices of FinTech platforms. Our method here is 
therefore to interrogate media, policy and academic-practitioner accounts of FinTech and the 
platform economy that provide for the business knowledge of FinTech platforms. The third 
and final part of the paper offers some concluding reflections.  
 
2. Understanding FinTech  
The portmanteau of ‘FinTech’ originates from a project called ‘Financial Services 
Technology Consortium’ started by Citigroup in the early 1990s. Today, in its broadest 
applications, the term draws attention to the role of information technologies in global 
wholesale and retail finance since at least the nineteenth-century (e.g. Buckley, Arner, and 
Barberis 2016). FinTech is normally applied more narrowly, referring to technological changes 
underway in retail finance since the 1950s (Rubini 2017, 2-3), and especially the emergence of 
a distinct sector of retail money and finance after the 2008 global financial crisis (e.g. Blakstad 
and Allen 2018, 4). Largely based around telecommunication and digital technologies and ‘big 
data’, the contemporary FinTech sector is accessed by users through mobile networks and 
smartphone applications linked to cloud computing.  
FinTech is also often categorised into several more-or-less discrete digital retail 
monetary and financial services. Book-length introductions, for example, often feature chapters 
dedicated to each category of services (e.g. Flynt 2016), which typically also appears as 
inseperable from a particular ‘group of companies that are introducing innovation into financial 
services through the use of modern technologies’ (Rubini 2017, 1). As the United Kingdom’s 
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HM Treasury (2018, 3) puts it, ‘The term “FinTech” is used interchangeably to describe both 
technology-driven innovation across financial services and to pick out a specific group of firms 
that combine innovative business models with technology to enable, enhance, and disrupt the 
financial services sector’. Narrated in these terms, FinTech includes: online and mobile 
monetary payments denominated in sovereign currencies (e.g. PayPal, Braintree); bitcoin and 
other cryptocurrency exchanges (e.g. Bitpay, Coinbase); online-only banks and banking apps 
(e.g. Atom, Monzo); crowdfunding (e.g. Kickstarter, Crowdfunder) and peer-to-peer (P2P) 
lending (e.g. Zopa, Lending Club); investment, saving and financial planning, such as ‘robo-
advisors’ (e.g. Wealthfront, Betterment), automated saving apps (e.g. Digit, Dyme), and 
interfaces and dashboards for money management (e.g. Mint, Money Dashboard); and, online 
lending to different and differentiated market segments, such as small- and medium-sized 
businesses (SMEs) (e.g. Kabbage, OnDeck), low- or high-risk consumers (e.g. LendUp, 
Borro), and payday borrowers (e.g. SafetyNet). An array of business-to-business (B2B) 
FinTech firms also service the industry, concentrating on data aggregation and algorithmic 
analytics (e.g. Cignifi, DemystData), applications of blockchain and other distributed ledger 
technologies (e.g. Peernova, Mirror), and user experience (UX) and user interface (UI) design 
(e.g. UXDA). 
 
2.1 ‘The platform’ 
Specialist and ostensibly innovative FinTech firms are platforms; that is, they largely 
correspond to a distinct mode of capitalist enterprise that aggregates and analyses data and 
deploys digital infrastructures in order to extract value from intermediation. Paraphrasing from 
Wood and Monahan’s (2019, 1) account of the difference between ‘platform surveillance’ and 
‘surveillance capitalism’ (cf. Zuboff 2019), our point is not just that FinTech (like 
contemporary surveillance) ‘happens to be facilitated by platforms’. Rather, over the last 
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decade or so, the political economy of FinTech has been fuelled by the ex poste rationalisation 
of ‘the platform’ as the business model for the global digital economy (Langley and Leyshon 
2017b, 20-23).  It is through this model that ‘more sectors, firms, startups, app developers, and 
investors mobilize’ around ‘one plausible version of information capitalism’ (Zuboff 2019: 
location 256 [Kindle edition]). As leading advocates of the platform business model Parker, 
Van Alstyne and Choudary (2016, 278) put it, ‘the bankers have heard the message that is 
spreading through one industry after another’, and, across the FinTech sector, ‘they are looking 
to the platform model as the chief disruptive mechanism’.   
During the dot.com boom of the 1990s, platform enterprises (e.g. social media 
companies, online market exchanges) often developed without a clear commercial rationale 
(Feng et al. 2001; van Dijck 2013; Kenney and Zysman 2020). In contrast, the FinTech sector 
has gained traction amidst burgeoning business knowledge and ‘how to’ guides about the 
platform model, not to mention the backing the model has received from venture capital and 
other investors (see below). Key features of the model include, for example: so-called socio-
technical ‘layers’ (infrastructure, data, users) (Choudary 2015); the potential to rapidly ‘scale 
up’ to market dominance with limited investment in fixed capital and other assets (Parker, Van 
Alstyne, and Choudary 2016; Kenney and Zysman 2018); and, promising revenue strategies 
which increasingly centre on value extraction from monetising combinations of user data with 
“platform ready” external web data (Helmond 2015).  
Within FinTech, firms specialising in payments and crowdfunding and P2P lending 
correspond particularly strongly with the platform business model: they intermediate multi-
sided ‘connections’ and relations between users and coordinate the network effects of 
‘connectivity’ (Srnicek 2016, 45). Start-ups providing online-only banking, investment, 
financial planning or loans, meanwhile, are typically business-to-consumer (B2C) platforms, 
or two-sided aggregator platforms that connect users with product and service providers (e.g. 
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banks, non-bank lenders) that partner with the platform. While rates of formation appear to 
have slowed somewhat in North America and Europe, by December 2019, Crunchbase, a 
widely recognised industry database, recorded a global population of over 13,000 FinTech 
platforms.  
Platform business experiments in FinTech extend beyond start-ups and early-career 
firms. Incumbent institutions in both the information and telecommunications (ICTs) and 
financial services industries are also leveraging the platform business model.  Major incumbent 
banks in the global North are now significant actors, ‘seeking combinations of old and new 
business models’ to reinvent their internal data systems and online business channels 
(Hendrikse, Bassens, and Van Meeteren 2018, 161).  Banks are integrating legacy hardware 
and software systems into platforms. This may be geared towards ‘open innovation’ and 
‘ecosystem’ approaches that, facilitated by Application Programmable Interfaces (APIs) and 
characteristic of the Apple business model, centre on FinTech firms harvesting data and 
building applications on bank platforms (Hendrikse, Bassens, and Van Meeteren 2018). 
Indeed, such an approach is being encouraged by ‘open banking’ regulations in the European 
Union and UK in particular (Efra 2019). To enable their in-house change programmes, 
however, banks are strategically engaging with FinTech start-ups in other ways, including 
partnerships, minority investments, and acquisitions.  
 
2.2 BigTech and the platform ecosystem 
BigTech companies now also offer FinTech platforms to their users, and/or have 
formed separate FinTech business arms or made investments in FinTech partners (Moeller 
2018). This includes the ‘Big Four’ of Google (Alphabet), Apple, Facebook and Amazon 
(GAFA) in the global North (Galloway 2017), and Baidu, Alibaba and Tencent (BAT) in 
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China. The GAFA BigTechs all offer payment platforms to their users, for example, such as 
Google Pay, Apple Pay and Amazon Pay, while 1.5 billion Facebook users can make payments 
via Messenger. Meanwhile, the growth of FinTech in China has been largely driven by the 
expansionary strategies of BAT (Economist 2017; Wang and Doan 2018). Indeed, the FinTech 
platforms of Alibaba and Tencent are arguably the most significant globally. Chinese consumers 
top EY’s (2019) Global FinTech Adoption Index, and mobile payment transactions by value 
($790 billion) in China in 2016 were 11 times greater than in the United States (Smith 2018). In 
2014, Alibaba consolidated its FinTech operations into a spin-off company, Ant Financial, 
which operates China’s most popular mobile payment platform (Alipay), and offers a host of 
digital banking, investment, lending and insurance services. Meanwhile, Tencent’s WeChat 
messaging app offers a range of transfer and payment functions to its 890 million users (Chandler 
2017).  
The FinTech sector is also reliant, more broadly, on telecommunication and digital 
infrastructures that are largely enclosed and controlled by telecom giants and BigTech 
platforms (O'Dwyer 2015; Sadowski 2020). FinTech in Africa is, for example, increasingly 
running on the telecommunication systems and ‘feature phones’ of Chinese corporations 
(Pilling 2019).  In the global North, meanwhile, FinTech is a platform political economy made 
possible by the integration and operation of the six layers of what Bratton (2015) describes as 
The Stack (i.e. ‘Earth’, ‘Cloud’, ‘City’, ‘Address’, ‘Interface’, ‘User’). For a number of 
emergent digital economy sectors – news media, urban transportation, healthcare, and 
education – GAFA and BAT have evolved into the ‘infrastructural platforms’ of ‘the platform 
ecosystem’ (van Dijck, Poell, and De Waal 2019). BigTech, in short, provides the highly 




For specialist FinTech platforms, hardware and software have increasingly become 
fixed costs rather than capital investments (Kenney and Zysman 2018). Combined with the 
B2B ‘off-the-shelf’ services of white label platform providers and UX and UI designers, this 
has significantly lowered the barriers to market entry for start-ups. Accordingly, FinTech 
platforms are often described as ‘tech stacks’ (e.g. Gupta and Tham 2018), integrated 
assemblages of infrastructural elements drawn from the platform ecosystem. The ‘back-end’ 
of the tech stack of FinTech platforms is what makes an app or a website run. Invisible to users, 
it includes cloud computing services (e.g. Amazon Web Services (AWS), Alibaba Cloud) and 
data analytics (e.g. Google Analytics), which can be combined and purchased from a single 
BigTech provider (e.g. Microsoft Azure and Microsoft Azure Data Analytics). Search engines, 
app stores, and identification services taken from the platform ecosystem are also critical to 
Fintech platforms. Meanwhile, the apps and interfaces that comprise the ‘front-end’ of the tech 
stack of FinTech platforms utilise Java or CSS programming code, often compiled from open 
source repositories maintained by BigTech (e.g. Bootstrap, AngularJS, ReactJS, Materialize). 
BigTech companies are important to the political economy of FinTech as platform providers 
of retail monetary and finance services, then, but the constitutive significance of the BigTech 
platform ecosystem to the FinTech sector goes much, much deeper.   
 
3. Processes of platform political economy 
Foregrounding the platform business model and platform ecosystem is key to a 
perspective that explicitly attends to the political-economic dynamics of FinTech. A 
perspective that understands FinTech as a platform political economy can also draw attention 
to processes of reintermediation, consolidation, and capitalisation. These processes are yet to 
feature strongly in social science research, even though they are presently shaping the 
development of the FinTech sector and its consequences for retail money and finance.  
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3.1 Platform reintermediation 
In the global North, FinTech is widely held to be ‘disintermediating’ retail money and 
finance. Taken to its conclusion, this could render banking intermediaries as mere clearing 
houses for business undertaken elsewhere ( Joyce 2019) . Consider, for example, Blackstad 
and Allen’s (2018, 4-9) account of what they call the FinTech Revolution. Prior to the global 
financial crisis, a ‘bloated’ corporate banking industry dominated retail finance and paid little 
attention to consumers. However, chastened by the crisis and emboldened by participation in 
the wider digital economy, consumers demanded ‘greater transparency and accountability’ in 
financial services and ‘a fragmented, app-based and partially gamified interface with their 
service providers’.  In this rendition of the distintermediation narrative, banking intermediation 
is rendered outmoded by consumers, and the emergence of FinTech platforms as the new 
intermediaries of retail money and finance is obscured.             
A core feature of the platform business model is the intermediation of multi- and two-
sided markets (Gawer 2014). Start-ups, BigTechs, banks and other incumbent institutions 
experimenting with this model in the FinTech sector are seeking to ‘reintermediate’ (not 
disintermediate) retail monetary and financial relations. Financial intermediation typically 
entails the reduction of transaction and/or information costs (type 1) and the creation of 
liquidity (type 2), and attempts at transformation are better understood as acts of 
reintermedation rather than disintermedation (French and Leyshon 2004). Contemporary 
platform reintermediation by FinTech firms primarily centres on type 1 forms of 
intermediation, but as firms scale they are also able to undertake type 2 intermediation. Indeed, 
what Erturk and Solari (2007) describe as the ‘reinvention’ of retail banking from the 1980s – 
with fees and charges for products and services overtaking earnings from interest rate spreads 
– actually provides the favourable institutional, social and economic conditions of possibility 
for platform reintermedation. Fees and charges have increasingly become a core source of 
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banking revenues, accounting for 65 percent of after-tax-profits in global retail banking in 2016 
(McKinsey 2016). As FinTechs undertake platform reintermediation, they are partly taking 
their cue from a transformation in which the formerly vertically integrated retail financial 
services of banks have already been unbundled (and re-bundled) to generate product sales. 
Viewed against the backdrop of the longer standing reintermediation of retail money 
and finance, the processes of FinTech platform reintermediation are distinctive nonetheless. 
For so-called ‘unbanked’ populations of ‘financial nomads’ in the global South (Realini and 
Metha 2015), FinTech enterprises might appear to deliver financial inclusion by providing 
users with monetary and financial services for the first time. Here, however, platform 
reintermediation actually displaces and transforms informal (i.e. non-market) monetary and 
financial relations (O'Dwyer 2015; Rodima-Taylor and Grimes 2019). In the global North, 
where incumbent banks are continuing to shrink branch networks in favor of online ‘business 
channels’ (Tiessen 2015), platform reintermediation by online-only and app-based banks 
certainly includes promises of ease of access and reduced transaction costs. But when online 
banking is the new normal, FinTech reintermedation is also as much about engineering 
‘frictionless’ platform infrastructures for more effective and appealing user transactions – so-
called UX and UI design –  as it is about offering lower fees and charges or better interest rates 
than the major banks (Ash et al. 2018) . 
FinTech platform reintermediation also represents a departure from reintermedation 
processes centred on information costs. Platforms play a similar informational role to banks 
and non-banking financial intermediaries in the global North when they charge fees, for 
example, for establishing the trust necessary to process a payment between users, conducting 
basic due diligence on the SMEs that they list for P2P loans, and assessing the creditworthiness 
of consumers for loans financed by their partners. However, platform reintermedation is not 
merely a matter of extracting ‘direct rent’ in the form of fees and charges, but also turns on 
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extracting ‘indirect rent’ by accruing user data and combining and analysing it with metadata 
(O'Dwyer 2015; Sadowski 2020). The role of information in intermediation is transformed 
when it is regarded as data and as a resource and source of value, not as a cost to others that is 
reduced and managed (for a fee or charge) on their behalf. This novel data-driven and data-
derived feature of platform reintermedation is pronounced in mobile and digital payments, 
where business models increasingly concentrate on the monetisation of transactions data to be 
used or sold for supply chain operations, market segmentation and/or credit risk analysis 
(O’Dwyer 2019). But data-derived reintermedation by platforms elsewhere in the FinTech 
sector – from robo-advice on investment portfolios to loans to consumers excluded or 
underserved by incumbent institutions – is also variously grounded in claims to discover 
consumer needs, offer better tailored products, and provide for improved analysis of credit 
risks. 
   
 
3.2 Platform consolidation 
It is often claimed that FinTech ‘new market entrants’ are ‘disrupting’ the dominance 
of banks and other incumbent providers, increasing competition in retail monetary and financial 
services in the global North (e.g. Flynt 2016). Developments in the US market for personal 
loans would seem to support these claims, for example (Siegfried 2019). For policymakers and 
regulators in the global North confronted by ‘too big to fail’ incumbents, FinTech represents 
an opportunity to increase competition in financial services. In the UK, for example, HM 
Treasury (2018, 2-3) considers Fintech to be ‘a fantastic example of how competition can be a 
force for good’, where ‘government, and regulators, have an important role to play in removing 
barriers to entry and growth, particularly for innovative firms’. If harnessed correctly to 
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maintain ‘consumer safety’ (Brainard 2020), regulators hope FinTech disruption could deliver 
renewed competitiveness to retail markets for money and finance. 
From a platform political economy perspective, equating the rise of FinTech with a 
wave of competition-enhancing disruption in existing markets for retail money and finance is 
problematic. Processes of consolidation rather than competition characterise FinTech because, 
fundamentally, successful platform reintermedation turns on transforming and monopolising 
new market structures of retail money and finance. As Parker, Van Alstyne and Choudary 
(2016, 210 original emphasis) argue, competition in platform economies proceeds on the basis 
that ‘firms that understand how platforms work can … remake markets, not just respond to 
them’. Crucially,  multi-sided platforms must have strong ‘demand economies of scale’ or 
‘network effects’: for users, the benefits of a platform increase as a function of the total number 
of users (Cusumano, Gawer, and Yoffie 2019). The primary initial strategic objective for those 
experimenting with the platform business model in FinTech is thus to rapidly recruit and retain 
user populations and their data, to ‘leverage network effects’ by ‘scaling up’.  
Ultimately, the consequence of these processes could be that FinTech replaces existing 
retail money and finance markets with newly structured and platformed arrangements that have 
monopolistic and oligopolistic tendencies. ‘BigTech-FinTech’ platforms are already 
acknowledged by some commentators to be the main threat to ‘too-big-to-fail’ banks 
(McWaters and Galaski 2017; McKinsey 2016).  However, we would caution against assuming 
that retail money and finance is only a BigTech banking license away from being captured 
(Delaporte, Price, and Bastid 2016). It is not in the interests of BigTech platforms to fully enter 
the banking industry due to the level of compliance and political and regulatory oversight that 
would follow (Moeller 2018). Indeed, amid political unease about the power of large digital 
platforms, the hostile reaction to Facebook’s 2019 plans to create its own cryptocurrency 
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(‘Libra’) illustrates that BigTech firms may face enhanced scrutiny and concerted political 
opposition as they seek regulatory approval for new financial products and services.  
We would want to stress, then, the variegated processes of FinTech platform 
consolidation presently underway across different markets and spaces. Centred on and around 
both BigTech companies and powerful incumbents, these processes of platform consolidation 
are having considerable impacts on the organisation of retail money and finance. In China, for 
example, BAT companies dominate FinTech by offering services to their vast populations of 
digital consumers and social media users. They have taken advantage of the ‘unique ability’ of 
platforms ‘to link together and consolidate multiple network effects’ (Srnicek 2016, 95), 
rapidly scaling up the FinTech side of their business. Mobile payments provided the bridgehead 
for the move by Alibaba and Tencent into FinTech, a multi-sided market line of business in 
which network effects are especially strong. Subsequent expansion has seen the introduction 
of ‘complementary products’ to their captured user populations, ‘build[ing] up ecosystems of 
goods and services that close off competitors’ (Srnicek 2016, 96). In 2013, for instance, Alibaba 
launched Yu’ebao, enabling e-shoppers to transfer dormant cash from their payment account 
on Alipay into a mutual fund investment account with rates of return above those available 
from bank deposit accounts. By 2017, Yu’ebao had US$165 billion dollars of assets under 
management (AUM), and had become the world’s largest money market mutual fund (Wang 
and Doan 2018).  
FinTech platforms operated by ICT and banking incumbents are also the focal point for 
processes of consolidation. In Kenya, for example, the transformation of M-Pesa from a mobile 
payments platform owned by incumbent telecoms giants into ‘a platform for financial inclusion’ 
is well underway (Ndung'u 2018: 37). Meanwhile, in North America and Europe in particular, 
and as we noted above, banks are building on their own economies of scale and scope by 
experimenting with the platform model. As a result, 
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FinTech has evolved from startups that want to take on and beat incumbents, to a 
broader ecosystem of different businesses looking in many cases for partnerships. 
FinTech startups don’t just need capital, they need customers. At the same time, 
incumbents need new approaches to drive change and deliver innovation (pwc 2017, 1). 
For those articulating business strategies in platform political economies, such partnership-based 
consolidation is crucial to successfully reintermediating and transforming markets. As Parker, 
Alstyne and Choudary (2016, 211) put it, a platform enterprise ‘no longer needs to seize every 
opportunity on its own’ and ‘can purse only the best opportunities while helping ecosystem 
partners seize the others’. pwc (2017) found that globally, by 2017, 45 percent of banks had 
partnerships with FinTech firms, up from 32 percent in 2016, while 82 percent of incumbents 
surveyed stated that they would be increasing their links to FinTechs.  
    
3.3.Platform capitalisation 
 A further and related process of platform political economy is also shaping the 
development of the FinTech sector and its consequences for retail monetary and financial order. 
A significant and integral feature of platform capitalism is that digital platforms are highly 
capitalised by investors (Kenney and Zysman 2018; Langley and Leyshon 2017b; Srnicek 
2016). During the decade or so between the global financial crisis and the present financial 
dislocations of the Covid-19 pandemic, platform capitalisation took place in a low interest-rate 
and unconventional monetary policy environment which was manifest, more broadly, in rising 
corporate indebtedness and increased investor appetite for risk (IMF 2019). Cheap money and 
risk-embracing investors were drawn to platforms by the relatively coherent and powerful 
framing of the future possibilities of the global digital economy provided by the platform 
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business model, and the demonstration of ‘powerful platform effects’ on existing market 
structures by BigTech giants (Waters, Kuchler, and Bradshaw 2018).  
Processes of platform capitalisation have been extensive in FinTech. Relative to other 
emerging digital economic sectors, FinTech appears to be particularly conducive to the 
progressive promises of new technology and the application of big data analytics (e.g. advanced 
machine learning) (cf. Geiger 2019; Rubini 2017). FinTech also seems to have especially 
promising revenue prospects, not least because of retrenchment by re-regulated retail banks 
during the recent decade  (Christophers, Leyshon, and Mann 2017)  Currently, the FinTech 
sector accounts for the greatest share of 400 or so ‘unicorns’: that is, globally, there are more 
privately-owned FinTech firms valued at over US$1 billion than there are similar firms in any 
other sector (Stalder and Miller 2018). 
Popular and prevailing accounts of FinTech tend to regard the scale of investment in 
the sector as a kind of vote of confidence, an indication of its likely future success in 
transforming retail money and finance and ‘banking the unbanked’. Rubini (2017, 5), for 
example, details the boom in investment in FinTech start-ups, such that, from 2015 to 2017, 
global investment amounted to US$122 billion, with the lion’s share in 2017 split roughly 
equally between the US and Asia (Hardin 2017). The first half of 2018 saw a further US$57.9 
billion worth of investment in FinTech. As Rubini (2017, 4) has it, the ‘start-ups that received 
funding are hungry and ambitious and want to disrupt the banking sector’. We would suggest, 
in contrast, that the capitalisation of FinTech platforms is actually a dynamic and diverse 
process that is variously intersecting and supporting the processes of platform reintermediation 
and consolidation.  
Globally, VC investment in FinTech platforms has featured successively larger rounds 
of funding for smaller numbers of firms. Evidenced by the growing number of FinTech 
unicorns, this is a common feature of the cycle of VC investment because fund portfolios are 
20 
 
expected to contain only a minority of investments that will ultimately pay-off after five to 10 
years (so-called ‘home runs’) (Feng et al. 2001). But it is especially pronounced for digital 
economy firms, as it is widely accepted that their investment costs are likely to be much greater 
than revenues for longer periods as they attempt to scale up to secure positions of strength in 
radically restructured markets. Related, private equity and other later-stage investors have 
become more prominent backers of FinTech firms (Sarch, Kiem, and Ballard 2018). Srnicek 
(2016, 88) neatly describes the processes that capitalise on the promise of monopolistic and 
oligopolistic futures for platform reintermediation as ‘VC welfare’, not least because equity 
maintains platforms as they seek to establish profitability and overcome incumbents.  
 Two further features of FinTech platform capitalisation have also sustained the sector 
in ways that intersect with processes of platform consolidation. First, in contrast with the 
dot.com era, it has become widely accepted that the so-called ‘liquidity event’ (when early-
stage investment is cashed-out) is not necessarily an IPO. The liquidity event for FinTech start-
ups is more likely to be an acquisition, especially by an incumbent financial institution, ICT 
company or BigTech platform. In 2018, for example, there were eight liquidity events in the 
US FinTech sector worth over $US100 million, six of which were acquisitions of this kind 
(Stadler and Miller 2019). Second, in China in particular, it is important to note that a 
significant share of VC investments in the FinTech sector have not been made by traditional 
VC funds, but by the Corporate Venture Capital (CVC) arms of BigTechs. BigTech is thus 
investing in FinTech platforms through CVC, as well as through in-house programs and 
acquisitions funded via their balance sheets (Waters, Kuchler, and Bradshaw 2018). The rise 
of CVC is not exclusive to China: CVC funds (such as Google Ventures) account for roughly 
five percent of total VC investment in the US. But CVC is especially important to Chinese 
venture investment (Yang 2019), with the CVC arms of Alibaba and Tencent specialising in 
technology investments and accounting for 40-50 percent of the total (Sender 2018). The 
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FinTech investments of the CVC arm of Alibaba include, for example, Paytm, the leading 
payments platform in India.       
 
4. Conclusions 
The emergence and growth of FinTech is  registering amongst social scientists. A 
burgeoning body of research has started to offer critical perspectives, challenging the prevailing 
and powerful imaginaries that presently animate the industry. Such perspectives tend to 
emphasise how FinTech is constituted through data aggregation and analysis and reliant upon 
telecommunications and digital technology infrastructures. Our aim in this paper, in contrast, 
has been to develop a perspective for critically understanding the political-economic dynamics 
and tendencies of FinTech, a perspective that explicitly specifies how FinTech is constituted 
as a platform political economy. This is not to deny the undoubted importance of data and 
infrastructures to the operations of FinTech, but rather to situate these facets of FinTech in the 
sector’s novel and rapidly evolving commercial and institutional settings. Placing the platform 
business model and platform ecosystem front-and-centre provides for a fresh perspective on 
the role of data and digital infrastructures in the workings of FinTech. Existing critical research 
certainly points to the importance of data aggregation and algorithms for the business of 
FinTech, but the promises and practices of data need to be understood in the context of 
experimentation with the platform as a model of capitalist intermediary enterprise. Equally, 
existing research highlights the socio-technical and infrastructural character of FinTech but 
omits how its ‘tech stacks’ are built on the platform ecosystem which is largely enclosed and 
controlled by BigTech. 
We certainly hope that the intervention made here will provoke further research into 
the platform political economy of FinTech, especially in the form of detailed analytical case 
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studies of FinTech platforms. Given the constraints of a paper of this kind, we have necessarily 
only been able to very briefly discuss a few specific and illustrative examples above. Our 
intervention may also further encourage and deepen the analysis of the development of 
platform political economies beyond the FinTech sector, such as the sectors that are the focus 
for van Dijck, Poell and De Waal (2019) and Fields (2018). Attending to the constitutive 
significance of the platform business model and platform ecosystem, such research should also 
be attuned to the distinct and related processes of reintermediation, consolidation and 
capitalisation that we have shown here to be shaping the FinTech sector and its consequences 
for retail money and finance. These processes are relatively under-researched by social 
scientists of FinTech, despite the ways in which they confound the powerful claims to 
disintermedation, disruption and so on that are usually made on the sector’s behalf.  
Interrogating specific instantiations of the platform business model and ‘tech stacks’ 
built on the platform ecosystem, analytical studies of FinTech platforms also need to pay 
particular attention to processes of platform political economy. Start-ups and early-career 
FinTechs, BigTech companies and ICT and banking incumbents alike are all engaged in 
processes of platform reintermediation. Rather than enhance competition in existing retail 
money and financial markets, platform reintermediation seeks to produce new market 
structures that will secure new oligopolistic and monopolistic positions. FinTech enterprises 
are thereby conducting their business operations amid intense processes of platform 
consolidation increasingly dominated by BigTech firms and incumbents. Platforms are also in 
the grip of processes of prospective capitalisation that,  over the decade running up to the 
presently unfolding Covid-19 pandemic at least, have variously selected and sustained those 
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